THẠC SĨ Performance-based voluntary group contracts for nonpoint source water pollution control.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Abstract ii
Dedication .iii
Acknowledgments iv
Vita .v
List of Figures .viii
Chapters:
1. INTRODUCTION
Background to Nonpoint Source Pollution Problem .1
Point versus Nonpoint Pollution 2
Purpose of the Study 3
NPS Pollution control programs 4
Current Policies 4
Critics of Current Programs .6
Theoretical Contributions 8
Alternative Proposals for Nonpoint Source Pollution .14
Contribution of This Study 17
Organization of the dissertation .20
2. THEORY AND BASIC MODEL
Introduction 22
Definitions 27
Joint Liability Group Contracts .30
Steps in the Contract 36
Designing a contract 37
Bidding Mechanism .38
Forming the group: Hidden Information 39
Action Time: Hidden action problem 42
vii
Peer Monitoring .43
Pay-off time .44
Peer Pressure: Time to separate good from bad .44
Asymmetric Information: Moral Hazard Problem .47
Model .49
Assumptions .50
Payment Mechanism 52
Agent’s Decision Problems 55
Principal’s Maximization Problem 63
Constraints .67
Participation Constraint .67
Fixed Payment Effect .69
Incentive Compatibility Constraint 71
Without Peer Monitoring .71
Exogenous Peer Monitoring 74
Finding Optimal Bonus Payment .76
Summary 82
3. GROUP CONTRACT WITH ENDOGENOUS PEER MONITORING
Introduction 84
Peer Monitoring .86
Formulation of the Model 89
Payment Mechanism 93
Agent’s Problem 94
Peer Monitoring and Payment Structure 101
Without Peer Monitoring Cost .104
Group size effect and Peer monitoring cost .105
Principal’s Problem: Optimal level of bonus payment 110
Summary 113
4. SUMMARY AND RESULTS
Summary 116
Results 118
Future Research Direction .119
5. APPENDIX A 121
6. BIBLIOGRAPHY 124
viii
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
2.1 Time-line of the relationship between the principal and the agents 34
2.2 Hypothetical Watershed with Nine Farmers 40
2.3 Probability distribution when shirking is very high .60
2.4 Probability distribution when shirking is relatively low 61
2.5 Probability distribution when shirking is very low 62
3.1 Peer monitoring and bonus payment relationship 74

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